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Reviewing St. Regis: Unresolved
Issues at the Intersection of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law
ABSTRACT

In July 2018, the Federal Circuit ruled that sovereign immunity
does not circumvent an inter partes review brought by the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board. By decidingagainst the tribe in Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals ("St. Regis"), the court determined that
inter partes reviews are adjudicatoryproceedings brought by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, and not an action brought by a
private party. This ruling was the second significant ruling regarding
inter partes reviews of the year, the first being the Supreme Court
holding that inter partes reviews are constitutional. While the specific
matter in the Federal Circuit is seemingly settled, questions remain
about the state of sovereign entities in patent law more generally. This
Note addresses some of the unanswered questions left in the wake of the
St. Regis decision and raises new questions and potential solutions for
future intersectionsof tribal sovereign immunity and patent law.
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For centuries, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has
protected tribal governments. The 573 federally recognized tribes in
the United States are domestic, dependent nations that have long been
recognized as independent states.' An important element of tribal
communities is their ability to self-govern, which maintains their
unique cultures and identities. 2 Even though members of a tribe are
members of three different sovereigns-namely, the tribe, the federal
government, and the state of residence-tribal governments have the
power to govern all matters within their territories. 3 One power, or
consequence, of tribal self-governance is that tribes cannot be haled into
US courts, with some exceptions. 4
But what happens when tribes and other entities use that power
in nontraditional ways? Corporate entities, such as payday lenders,
have historically attempted to use the doctrine of sovereign immunity
to "shield" themselves from private suit.5 Agreements between tribes

and these corporate entities for the purpose of utilizing immunity are
quite common. While some are made in good faith, other business
models may arise from a more sinister plan to improperly avoid
litigation by "renting" immunity.6 It is thus up to courts to determine
whether transactions between entities and tribes are genuine, and how
to rule on the validity of immunity in these cases. Such determinations
may be cumbersome for courts, as they have to balance the
considerations of federal Indian law and the law of the jurisdiction in
which the case is being brought, among other things.7

1.
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); Tribal Nations & the United
States: An Introduction, NAT'L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes
[https://perma.cc/XD4C-BTFE] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
See Tribal Nations & the United States: An Introduction, supra note 1.
2.
See id.
3.
4.
See infra Section I.B.
See Leslie Bailey, "Tribal Immunity" May No Longer Be a Get-Out-Of-Jail Free Card
5.
for Payday Lenders, PUB. JUST. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.publicjustice.net/tribal-immunity-mayno-longer-get-jail-free-card-payday-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/WA2W-ZMPT].
6.
See Jeremy K. Robinson, "Rent-A-Tribe"Arrangements Under Fire, DAILY J. (Jan. 14,
[https://perma.cc/454Phttps://caseygerry.com/rent-a-tribe-arrangements-under-fire/
2015),
ZTV8]; infra Section I.B.
See Robinson, supra note 6.
7.
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One area that courts have recently explored is the intersection
between sovereign immunity and patent law. Given the high stakes of
patent litigation, as well as the numerous ways parties can challenge
patent validity, it comes as no surprise that some entities would develop
creative solutions to their patent troubles. The US Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit recently ruled on one such creative solution in a case
where a party tried transferring its patents to a tribe in an attempt to
use tribal sovereign immunity to dismiss an inter partes review (IPR). 8
On July 20, 2018, the Federal Circuit decided Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals("St. Regis").9 The appellants consisted
of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe and Allergan, a pharmaceutical
company ("Allergan").1 0 The appellees consisted of three other
pharmaceutical companies, Mylan, Teva, and Akron.1 1 Holding for the
appellees ("Mylan"), the court explained that because IPRs are
enforcement actions by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity to shield a patent
from an IPR challenge. 12 However, the court did not address other
issues that the parties raised, such as whether the transaction itself
was valid.
This Note examines that decision in depth and offers critiques of
the court, as well as recommendations on the interesting collision of
tribal immunity and patent law. Part I introduces these relevant areas
of law and the St. Regis case. Part II offers potential scenarios where
this collision may occur in the future. Part III suggests that either
Congress should act on the issue or, alternatively, that courts should
employ a balancing test that reconciles tribal sovereign immunity
interests within the patent law realm in lieu of congressional action. To
conclude, Part IV briefly remarks on the overall impact of the decision
if there is no recourse in the wake of St. Regis.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part first outlines patent proceedings under the America
Invents Act (AIA) and briefly details patent litigation-comparing
different avenues for bringing patent claims. Then, it explains the
history and application of tribal sovereign immunity, with a focus on
when immunity does not apply. These two topics merged in St. Regis.

8.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2018). For a review of IPRs, see infra Section I.A.
9.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1322.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
Id. at 1326-27.
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Lastly, this Part discusses the history, or lack thereof, of tribal
immunity assertions in the intellectual property (IP) realm.
A. Patent ProceedingsGenerally
When the AIA went into effect in September 2012, it created a
procedure called inter partes review, or IPRs.1 3 IPRs allow a nonpatent
owner to file a written petition to challenge the validity of a granted
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an
patent. 14
administrative body within the USPTO, conducts both IPRs and postgrant reviews (PGRs).1 5 The AIA created the PTAB at the same time
as IPRs to review granted patents. 16
Congress created IPRs to provide a more efficient system for
7
Although critics
challenging patents and reducing litigation costs.'
18
argue that IPRs fall short of realizing these goals, the Supreme Court
recently held that IPRs are here to stay in April 2018 when it decided
9
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC.1 In
Oil States, the Court held that the language of the AIA under which
20
IPRs operate does not violate Article III of the US Constitution.
Oil States addressed the ambiguous nature of IPRs from a
constitutional viewpoint. 21 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
explained that even though IPRs include some features of civil
22
For
litigation, they may be conducted in a non-adversarial fashion.
example, the PTAB can proceed to a final decision even if a petitioner
has chosen to remove himself from the proceeding. 23 The Court decided
Oil States on narrow grounds. As such, the Court only ruled on the
constitutionality of IPRs; moreover, it explicitly stated that the decision
does not reach (1) whether patent infringement actions can be held in a
non-Article III forum or (2) whether patents are considered property

See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018).
13.
§ 312; see also Melissa Cerro, Navigating a Post America Invents Act World: How the
14.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Supports Small Business, 34 J. NAT'LAss'NADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
193, 222 (2014).
15.
35 U.S.C. § 6.
See id.
16.
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
17.
See, e.g., Joel Sayres & Julie Wahistrand, To Stay or Not to Stay Pending IPR? That
18.
Should Be a Simpler Question, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 52, 53 (2018) (describing how courts
have not applied reexaminations in IPRs consistently).
See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379
19.
(2018).
Id. at 1380.
20.
See id. at 1373-75.
21.
See id. at 1378.
22.
See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (2018).
23.
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under the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. 2 4 Because of the
Court's narrow holding of Oil States and the relative recentness of the
AIA, lower courts are still left tackling issues related to the ambiguous
nature of IPRs. 25
IPRs were not the only method of challenging the validity of a
patent that the AIA introduced. In addition to IPRs, a petitioner can
challenge the validity of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 321, which created
PGRs. 26 The PTAB conducts both IPRs and PGRs and the reviews
share many key similarities. 27 Like IPRs, PGRs aim to provide patent
holders who may wish to allege infringement with cost-effective options
outside of civil litigation, 28 which can be expensive for all parties
involved. 29
Despite the introduction of IPRs and PGRs, parties still utilize
patent litigation, especially those seeking to take advantage of the
system.3 0
For example, patent trolls initiate litigation to take
advantage of the patent law system by collecting royalties on the
patents they own without providing services. 31 Trolls earn their money
by asserting their patent rights against an alleged infringer.3 2
Commenters in the patent realm have differing opinions regarding the
legitimacy of patent trolls, 3 3 but it is widely believed that most trolls
assert their property through infringement litigation based on the
threat of litigation costs. 34
The costs of settling patent litigation suits are well-documented,
with some commenters estimating average settlements to be anywhere
24.
25.
26.
27.

See
See
See
See

Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
infra Section I.C.
35 U.S.C. §§ 321-322.
Chad M. Rink, Post-GrantReview and Inter Partes Review, POST GRANT PROC.,

http://www.postgrantproceedings.com/post-grant-review-and-inter-partes-review/#

[https://perma.cc/K9HF-AYXJ] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
28.
See id.
29.
See Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 5,
2013),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patent-litigation/id=34808/
[https://perma.cc/E848-REE2].
30.
See W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter Partes Review: Rent
Seeking as a Tool to DiscouragePatent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1163, 1186 (2016).
31.
See John M. Golden, 'PatentTrolls'and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112
(2007).
32.
See Joel B. Carter, Responding to a PatentTroll's Threats, 48 ARK. LAW. 30, 30 (2013).
33.
Compare TJ Chiang, What Is a Troll Patent and Why Are They Bad?, PATENTLY-O
(Mar. 6, 2009), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-troll-patent-and-why-are-theybad.html/ [https://perma.cc/243Z-VG5Q] (stating that troll patents do not contribute anything
useful to society), and Dennis Crouch, Senate on Patent Reform, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 4, 2014),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/04/senate-patent-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/CYM5-FA8E]
(quoting Senator Charles Schumer's negative views on patent trolls), with Carter, supra note 30,
at 30 (suggesting that patent trolls can enhance the policing abilities of inventors).
34.
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 30, at 30.
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from $1.33 million to $7.27 million, depending on the size of the
companies involved. 35 In addition, a large portion of the litigation costs
come from attorney's fees, discovery costs, and expert retention. 36 As
long as patent litigation remains profitable for trolls, the AIA's wellintentioned review proceedingS 37 may not deter trolls from threatening
Additionally, troll-like rent seeking activity is
civil litigation.3 8
prevalent even in the IPR battleground in the form of invalidity
assertion entities. 39 These entities take advantage of the ambiguous
IPR process to challenge the validity of granted patents. 40
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Tribes enjoy the same common law sovereign immunity
traditionally enjoyed by the federal government and state sovereign
powers.4 1 Common justifications for the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity include protecting the scarce resources of tribes and
preserving Congress' "trust-like" relationship with tribes. 42 From the
doctrine's beginning, Congress has been the federal government's
liaison for tribal relations. 4 3 Such relations have always been deemed
political and, thus, not subject to control by the judicial branch of the
government per the separation of powers. 44 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court in cases like Turner v. United States defined tribal immunity to
include a privilege that a tribe cannot be sued without its consent, due
to its relationship with Congress.4 5
Importantly, a tribe may raise its immunity as a defense to suits
brought against it, albeit with some restrictions. 46 Tribes are typically
insulated from private suits with exceptions, such as when immunity is
See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
35.
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014).
36.

See Neumeyer, supra note 27.

See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
37.
See Schuster, supra note 28, at 1163-64.
38.
See id. at 1164.
39.
See id. at 1164-65, 1172-74. It is worth noting that such entities are also suggested
40.
to oppose traditional patent trolls. See id.
41.
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
See Amelia A. Fogleman, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Proposal for
42.
Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1349-50 (1993) (noting that the
Supreme Court has long recognized this relationship, allowing Congress to yield power over tribes
mainly through legislation).
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
43.
See id. at 565.
44.
See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357-59 (1919).
45.
See Eric Governo, Comment, Tribal Sovereign Immunity; History, CompetingPolicies,
46.
and Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. ManufacturingTechnologies, Inc., 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 175, 176
(1999).
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waived, which this Note later expands upon. 4 7 Additionally, suits
enforcing federal laws against tribes are generally precluded, absent
such exceptions. 4 8
Some in rem suits are an example of one of these exceptions. In
rem proceedings are actions that generally involve the status of a
"thing," or property, and the related rights of persons with respect to
that property. 49 According to Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren,
sovereign immunity may apply to in rem proceedings in certain
situations.5 0
In Upper Skagit, the tribe acquired land and was
subsequently sued by a private party in a boundary dispute.5 1 In
avoiding the question of whether immunity applies to in rem
proceedings, the Supreme Court turned to a separate decision from the
lower court that rejected the tribe's claim for sovereign immunity in
such proceedings. 5 2 As a result, the Court left the question of whether
sovereign immunity applies to immovable property located in the
territory of another sovereign. 53
Conversely, there are some bright line limits to sovereign
immunity. Importantly, the US government may generally bring suit
against tribal governments. 54
In addition, tribes cannot assert
immunity from adjudicatory proceedings and traditional agency
actions.55 Although case law provides guidelines, limitations on the
scope of sovereign immunity can still spark debate, since courts may
draw different lines due to the infinite number of ways that an assertion
of sovereign immunity can be brought to court.56

47.
See Michael P. O'Connell, Citizen Suits Against Tribal Governments and Tribal
Officials Under Federal Environmental Laws, 36 TULSA L.J. 335, 338-39 (2013); infra Section
II.B.2.
48.
See O'Connell, supra note 45 at 338-39.
49.
See, e.g., United States v. Freights, etc., of S.S. Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466, 471-72
(1927) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
50.
See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1652 (2018).
Id.
51.
52.
Id. The Court stated that the lower court misread Yakima when it interpreted
Yakima's holding to say that sovereign immunity does not apply when a judge exercises in rem
jurisdiction over a tribe. See id.; City of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992).
53.
See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S. Ct. at 1653-54.
54.
See O'Connell, supra note 45, at 338-39.
55.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2018); infra Section I.C.
56.
See Thomas P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searchingfor Sensible Limits, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 173, 179-80, 189-93 (1988).
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Sovereign immunity extends to various areas of law, from
administrative law 5 7 to tax law.5 8 As such, tribal sovereign immunity

carries with it the potential for lucrative business endeavors.5 9 For
example, tribes may enter regulated commercial activities, like gaming
operations, with immunity from state and federal regulation as long as
said activities function as part of the tribal government. 60 It follows
that as long as tribal immunity exists, it may be viewed as a valuable
asset to avoid regulation.6 1
But tribal immunity is not absolute, as Congress determines
when an Indian tribe may invoke immunity. First, Congress may
legislate with regards to the circumstances in which parties may bring
suit against an Indian tribe. 62 This process, called abrogation, requires
that Congress expressly state its intention to limit tribal immunity
unequivocally. 63 While seemingly a bright-line rule, Congress rarely
abrogates immunity by explicitly applying statutes to Indian tribes. 64
This sometimes leaves courts to determine whether Congress intended
to abrogate tribal immunity-first considering whether the tribe has
immunity and, if it does, whether Congress intended to avail the tribe
to private suit. 6 5 Furthermore, Congress has been careful not to
abrogate broadly, favoring narrow legislation that tends to allow tribes
to govern themselves.6 6 Congress has reiterated the long-standing
purpose of tribal sovereign immunity to strengthen the economic
development of tribes. 67
Congressional abrogation has limits as well. In FloridaPrepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the
Court decided that congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity within a statute was invalid because the State did not violate

See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 803-04 (2014).
57.
See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
58.
505, 514 (1991).
59.
See Governo, supra note 44, at 206.
See Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 66, 73 (Cal. Ct. App.
60.
1999) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity extended to a tribal corporation formed by the tribe
to operate the casino).
See Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L.
61.
REV. 398, 402 (2009).
62.
See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
63.
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Fla., 685 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012). Since tribal immunity stems from federal
law and is not mandated by the Constitution, Congress may limit its power by congressional
declaration through statute at any time. See McLish, supra note 54, at 181.
See Clay R. Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 ADVOCATE 19, 21 (2007).
64.
65.
See id.
66.
See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 510 (1991).
67.
See id.
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 8 The statute,
which expressly abrogated states' immunity from patent infringement
claims, did not address widespread deprivation of constitutional rights
of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper legislation.6 9 The
Court reasoned that by providing a remedy, the State did not deprive
patent owners of their rights under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 70 Thus, if a state provides such a remedy for a deprivation
of property, then any congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity in that area is constitutionally inadequate.7 1
Congressional abrogation is not the only way to overcome the
sovereign immunity hurdle. A tribe may waive sovereign immunity if
it unequivocally expresses its intent to do so. 72 Tribes may waive their
immunity from suit in various ways, such as in business transactions
and contractS 73 or through litigation. 74
When one thinks of the concept of waiving rights (for example,
Miranda rights), waiver of individual rights may be the context that
first come to mind. However, tribal immunity is a different type of right
since it applies to tribal governments, not individuals.7 5 Because tribal
immunity is a right based on a congressional grant of power, analysis
of waiver is specialized regarding whether a tribe has waived its rights.

For example, in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the plaintiffs sued the tribal defendants to
enforce an arbitration clause in a construction contract. 76 The tribe
68.
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630, 637 (1999). While Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board involves
patent infringement with respect to state sovereign immunity, the specific facts of this case extend
beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses primarily on tribal sovereign immunity. Still, state
sovereign immunity is functionally similar to tribal sovereign immunity and is highly relevant in
the patent realm due to the high volume of patents owned by state universities. See Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 808-09 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 670; Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive
Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the "Sword" of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned
Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1591-92 (2010).
69.
See Fla. PrepaidPostsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 645-46 (quoting City
of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
70.
See id. ("The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not
respond to a history of "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights" of the sort
Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic section 5 legislation. City of Boerne, 521 U.S.,
at 526, 117 S. Ct. 2157. Instead, Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to
a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution.").
71.
See id. at 647-48.
72.
See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S.
411, 418-20 (2001).
73.
See id. at 418-20.
74.
See Smith, supra note 62, at 20.
75.
See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1289 (2017).
76.
C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414.
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asserted sovereign immunity, arguing that it did not expressly waive
its immunity by signing a contract with an arbitration clause.7 7 Holding
for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court reasoned that although the tribe
is generally entitled to assert its immunity, the arbitration clause
served as a waiver of said immunity because the tribe affirmatively
agreed to arbitrate in the contract.7 8
However, not all tribal immunity waivers are contractual, which
can make issues of waiver unclear. 79 In cases where no explicit
contractual waiver exists, what constitutes a waiver may vary from
court to court.8 0 For example, in Ramey Construction Co., Inc. v. Apache
Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, the plaintiffs argued that the tribal
defendants waived their sovereign immunity by entering into several
business agreements and actions that did not differ greatly from
contracts,8 1 such as agreeing to loan agreements with a bank or
including general arbitration clauses in its tribal charter. 82 In holding
for the defendants, the court declined to find a waiver from these actions
because there was no express waiver, nor was there any explicit
83 In
arbitration clause in a contract like that seen in C & L Enterprises.
other circumstances, tribal businesses may waive immunity depending
on whether they qualify as a corporate body or a governmental entity.84
Tribes may also waive their sovereign immunity by passing
statutory waivers they draft themselves. 85 Tribes may waive certain
limitations in a potential suit by consenting to them, but other
limitations to which they did not consent must be strictly ruled in favor
of the tribe.8 6 Through this method, tribes are able to dictate conditions
that may trigger, with some certainty, when courts will allow suit.8 7

77.
Id. at 421.
78.
See id. at 420-21.
79.
See Fogleman, supra note 40, at 1365-68.
See id. at 1365.
80.
See Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 319
81.
(10th Cir. 1982).
82.
See id.
83.
See id.
See Fogleman, supra note 40, at 1367. Courts suggest that this difference is intended
84.
to "enable the tribes to make maximum use of their property." Id.
85.
See id. at 1373.
86.
See id.
87.
See id.
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C. Federal Circuit:No Sovereign Immunity in IPRs
In 2018, the Federal Circuit addressed issues that unexpectedly
merged IPRs with tribal immunity when it decided St. Regis. The
dispute began in 2015 when Allergan sued Mylan in the US District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas for patent infringement.8 8
Allergan, a pharmaceutical company, sued Mylan, another
pharmaceutical company, for patent infringement on the technology
underlying their product, Restasis, a treatment for dry eye symptoms. 8 9

In 2016, Mylan, Teva Pharmaceuticals, and Akorn, Inc. petitioned the
PTAB for IPR of the Restasis patents.9 0 The PTAB granted the petition
and scheduled the oral hearing for the IPR to take place on September
15, 2017.91
Just one week before the scheduled hearing, Allergan
transferred title of the Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe ("the Tribe"). 92 The Tribe and Allergan then moved to terminate
the IPRs on the basis of sovereign immunity asserted by the Tribe. 93
Allergan also moved to withdraw from the proceedings. 94 The PTAB
denied both of these motions, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTAB's decision in July 2018.95 Allergan petitioned, but the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on April 15, 2019.96
By way of tribal immunity, Allergan's main argument relied on
the proposition that IPRs are adjudicatory proceedings between private
parties.9 7 Relying on a Supreme Court case decided in 2002, Federal
Maritime Commission v. S.C. State Ports Authority (FMC), 98 Allergan
argued that because the USPTO does not first bring the issues that
commence IPR proceedings, they are less like traditional agency actions
and thus are adjudicatory proceedings between private parties. 99
Therefore, they should be permitted to assert sovereign immunity to

88.
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 1325-26.
96. SCOTUSblog, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., (April 15, 2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/saint-regis-mohawk-tribe-v-mylan-pharmaceuticalsinc/

97.
98.
(2002)).
99.

Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326.
Id. (citing Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747, 756
Id.
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dismiss the case under FMC.100 In FMC, the Supreme Court extended
state sovereign immunity principles to administrative adjudications
because "the Framers would have thought . .. that the States possessed
immunity" from such adjudications. 10 1 Furthermore, the FMC Court
reasoned that since the Federal Maritime Commission agency
proceedings in question and civil litigation are overwhelmingly similar,
state sovereign immunity applies in order to comply with the Framers'
view of states' dignity. 10 2
Mylan argued that IPRs are not an adjudicatory proceeding
between private parties, but rather are a PTAB reconsideration of
This argument was
government-granted property's validity. 103
successful, as the Federal Circuit narrowly held that tribal immunity
does not apply to IPRs. 104 Although the court characterized IPRs as
neither a purely judicial proceeding by a private party nor an
enforcement action by the federal government, several factors
convinced it to lean towards the latter.10 5 The Court first distinguished
FMC by stating that unlike the Federal Maritime Commission, the
Director of the USPTO has broad discretion to decide whether to
institute a proceeding. 106 Additionally, the petitioner of an IPR may
choose not to participate after initiating that IPR, reinforcing the view
The court further
that the USPTO itself conducts IPRs.10 7
distinguished IPRs from civil suits based on differences between
procedural rules in IPRs and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g.,
discovery rules).10 8
While the Federal Circuit addressed whether tribal sovereign
immunity applies in IPRs, it explicitly left open the question of whether
state sovereign immunity would apply in such proceedings. 109
Furthermore, Mylan advanced additional arguments that went
unaddressed. First, even if the Tribe could assert sovereign immunity,
Mylan argued that this transaction was an impermissible attempt to
"market an exception" from the law.1 10 Similarly, Mylan argued that

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 756, 760.
See id. at 760.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326.
Id. at 1329.
See id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
See id. at 1329.
Id. at 1326.
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the assignment was a sham and that the Tribe waived its ability to
assert sovereign immunity by suing on the patents.11 1
Because of the high stakes of patent litigation and the Federal
Circuit's narrow holding in St. Regis, issues that merge tribal sovereign
immunity and patent law will inevitably arise in the future. A number
of amici filed briefs in response to the PTAB's decision to deny
Allergan's motions.
These briefs raised more potential issues
surrounding IPRs, such as whether IPRs are in rem proceedings that
sovereign immunity does not protect, 112 whether Congress should
address the issue in St. Regis,"' and how to manage which party is the
"real" interest holder after a patent transaction. 1 14 Other issues amici
raised, which were mainly in support of the tribe, included the
threatened resources of sovereign tribes and growth of tribes in the IP
arena.11 5 One of the most interesting problems here, however, is the
issue of when immunity is waived. Mylan 16 and other organizations1 1 7
raised the issue, but the Federal Circuit left it open.11 8

&

111.
Id. Technically, it was Allergan who sued on the patents. Id. at 1325.
112.
See, e.g., Brief of the High Tech Inventors All., Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n,
Internet Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2017-00576, 2017 WL 6272028 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2017) (Nos.
IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR201601132); Brief of the Ass'n for Accessible Meds. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6-7,
Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2017 WL 6272023 (Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, 1PR2016-01129,
IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132).
113.
See Brief of the R Street Inst. & Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees at 7-12, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d 1322 (Nos. 2018-1638, 2018-1643), 2018
WL 2283701; Brief of Amicus Curiae U.S. Inv'r, LLC in Support of Patent Owner, the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe at 6, Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2017 WL 6272020 (Nos. IPR2016-01127, 1PR2016-01128,
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132).
114.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Software & Info. Indus. Ass'n in Support of Petitioners
at 11-12, Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2017 WL 6272019 (Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR201601129, IPR2016-01130,IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132).
115.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Native Am. Intellectual Prop. Enter. Council, Inc.
Regarding Patent Owner's Motion to Dismiss at 2-6, Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2017 WL 6272018 (Nos.
IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR201601132).
116.
See Brief of Appellees at 30-31, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d 1322 (No. 20181638), 2018 WL 2234327. For a detailed discussion on extending IP law concepts to indigenous
knowledge, see J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Humanizing Intellectual Property: Moving Beyond the
Natural Rights Property Focus, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 207, 208-09 (2017).
117.
See Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians, Nat'l Indian Gaming
Ass'n, & United South & Eastern Tribes in Support of Patent Holder the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe's
Motion to Dismiss at 9-13, Mylan Pharm. Inc., 2017 WL 6272021 (Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR201601128, IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132).
118.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329.
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D. A Primeron Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Patent Law
In general, sovereign immunity does not extend to actions that
are either brought by the federal government or a government
agency.11 9 Therefore, courts must distinguish private causes of action
from those where the government is a party. To do so, courts consider
whether a proceeding has traits in common with civil litigation. 120 If So,
then the proceeding is less like a government action, and thus likely
precluded by sovereign immunity. 121 The Federal Circuit recognized
this in its St. Regis decision, where it found that private parties do not
bring IPRs, but rather the USPTO itself does. 122 But the St. Regis
decision was not the first time that the Federal Circuit tackled
sovereign immunity in an adjudicatory action regarding intellectual
property. In 2007, the Federal Circuit heard Vas-Cath v. Curators of
University of Missouri.123 In Vas-Cath, the court cited factors that
determined whether a USPTO interference proceeding bore similarities
to civil litigation. 124 There, the defendant-university requested that the
USPTO conduct an interference proceeding, a litigation-type activity. 12 5

The court held that the interference claim waived the university's
ability to assert state sovereign immunity because it initiated the
USPTO interference. 1 2 6 Accordingly, in St. Regis, the Tribe and
Allergan bolstered their FMC analysis by distinguishing Vas-Cath from
their case. 12 7 Among other things, they argued that Vas-Cath allows
the FMC analysis to apply sovereign immunity to administrative
adjudications that are like lawsuits between private parties. 128
In patent litigation suits, lower courts have dismissed actions
In Home Bingo Network v.
because of sovereign immunity. 129
Multimedia Games, the plaintiffs brought a patent infringement claim
against the defendants Multimedia Games, Inc. and the Miami Tribe of

129.

See Native American Tribes Immune from Patent Infringement Suits, FOLEY

&

119.
See id. at 1325.
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
120.
121.
See id. at 761-62.
122.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327.
See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. ofMo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
123.
124.
Id. at 1382.
125.
Id. at 1378, 1383.
126.
See id. at 1383-84.
See Brief of Appellants at 20, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d 1322 (Nos. 18-1638,
127.
18-1639, 18-1640, 18-1641, 18-1642, 18-1643), 2018 WL 1989302.
128.
See id. at 19-20.
LARDNER LLP (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.foley.com/native-american-tribes-immune-frompatent-infringement-suits- 12-18-2013 [https://perma.cc/EN86-K2WA].
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Oklahoma Business Development Authority. 130 The Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma Business Development Authority filed a motion to dismiss
the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, invoking sovereign
immunity because it is an arm of an Indian tribe. 13 1 Since the tribe is
federally recognized, the tribe did not waive its immunity, and Congress
has not abrogated tribal immunity in patent infringement cases, the
district court granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss. 132
The collision of tribal sovereign immunity and IPRs is
unexpected, but has raised many issues-some of which extend beyond
patent law. The remainder of this Note explores other potential
collisions between these two distinct areas of law, and how courts may
react to such collisions after St. Regis.
II. ANALYSIS
In the wake of the St. Regis decision, questions remain as to
whether tribal immunity applies in other patent proceedings. If the
Federal Circuit's decision to disallow defenses of tribal sovereign
immunity extends to all patent proceedings, some would argue that this
would suppress the IP rights of tribes, diminishing the use of their
sovereignty for the economic benefit of their citizens. 133 Surely, courts
can find a balance that discredits contracts like Allergan's alleged
"sham" transaction while preserving the long-standing doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity.
This Part explores different scenarios in which this issue may
surface again. Hypotheticals are limited to the scope of an assertion of
tribal immunity in a patent proceeding but vary based on the legitimacy
of a patent transaction, the timing of the proceeding, and which partythe infringer or the infringed-asserts the immunity. The analysis of
each scenario involves two components: (1) a prediction of what a court,
or the PTAB, should rule in response to a claim of tribal sovereign
immunity in wake of St. Regis and (2) other potential avenues of action
outside of the courts. The primary goal of this Part is to explore
different scenarios in which tribal sovereignty and patent law may
intersect, as well as to analyze which actors are best equipped to handle

130.
See Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia Games, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-0608, 2005 WL
2098056, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).

131.

Id.

132.
Id. at *1-2; see also Microlog Corp. v. Cont'1 Airlines, Inc., No. 6: 10-CV-260, 2011 WYL
13141413, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2011) (holding that an arm of a tribal nation is entitled to the
Tribe's immunity).
133.
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 124, at 31-34.
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such an intersection while maintaining both the rights of tribes and the
integrity of patent law.

A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in PGRs
PGRs present the most similar hypothetical to the St. Regis
scenario. Imagine that a tribe attempted to assert tribal sovereign
immunity after a party filed a PGR petition against a patent that the
tribe owned. At first glance, PGRs differ from IPRs as to both the
grounds for asserting invalidity and the timeline for initiating an
action.13 4 In addition to the stricter timeline for filing a PGR, the
grounds for asserting invalidity under PGRs are broader than under
IPRs.1 35 However, PGRs share many similarities with IPRs when
examining their status in the wake of St. Regis. 136
The court in St. Regis was concerned with the attributes that
made IPRs similar to an agency enforcement action. 137 PGRs share
most of the same attributes. Perhaps most importantly, like IPRs, the
PTAB conducts PGRs 138 and the Director of the USPTO has the
authority to determine whether a PGR will be instituted. 139
To counter the similarities, tribes could argue that because the
rules of discovery in PGRs are different than in IPRs, PGRs should be
treated more like civil litigation. 140 However, like in IPRs, PGR
discovery is limited-a party may only produce evidence directly related
to factual assertions. 141 Because the St. Regis court concluded that IPR
proceedings are unlike civil litigation, partly because of their limited
discovery, the Federal Circuit would likely view PGRs similarly. 142
For these reasons, the PTAB and courts should not allow tribes
to assert sovereign immunity in PGRs after denying tribal immunity
from IPRs in St. Regis.

B. "Allergan-Like"Transactions in Civil Litigation
Allergan attempted to shield itself from a filed IPR by assigning
the Restasis patents to the Tribe in exchange for the Tribe's promise to

134.
135.
136.
137.
2018).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See

Rink, supra note 25.
id.
id.
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.

See Rink, supra note 25.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 324(a)-(b) (2018).
See Rink, supra note 25.
See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5); Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1328.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1328.
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invoke its sovereign immunity. 143 Alternatively, imagine a scenario in
which Allergan attempted this maneuver in the middle of a civil patent
infringement suit. Because tribes are immune from civil litigation,
sovereign immunity would surely apply, and the case would be
dismissed in the manner that Allergan argued for in St. Regis. 144
But there are various practical implications as to why this
should not be the case. First, it is important to consider whether or not
Allergan's maneuver was a "sham transaction," as Mylan argued in St.
Regis.145 On the St. Regis facts, it is relatively clear that Allergan's
assignment of the Restasis patents to the Tribe was for the purpose of
dodging the IPR challenge, given the timing of the transaction. 146
Intuitively, such a transaction should not be allowed to shelter a
corporation from civil litigation. 147 If companies were allowed to assign
their patents to a tribe when sued, more infringers would engage in
such activity as a shield against costly litigation.
This heavily
undermines the purpose of IP law, which aims to encourage innovative
activity and protect the inventive rights of innovators. 14 8
Furthermore, allowing companies to seek shelter under the
guise of tribal sovereign immunity may result in an increase in the
amount of IPRs filed. If potential plaintiffs are concerned that tribal
immunity would shield an infringing patent from suit, they would
instead file with the PTAB under St. Regis. While the costs of
litigation1 49 may make this seem like a win for all parties involved,
there are various reasons why a party would want to file in district
courts rather than the USPTO.15 0 Perhaps most crucially, plaintiffs can
choose from a broader range of issues when challenging a patent in
district court, as well as gather evidence via discovery with a wider
scope. 15 1
Allowing "Allergan-like" maneuvers to shield patent
infringers from suit in district court will eliminate the advantages that
a challenger may enjoy in civil litigation, and force them into filing an
IPR. 152
143.
See supra Section I.C.
144.
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 124, at 19-21.
145.
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326.
146.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 2-3.
147.
See Narechania, supra note 66, at 1607-08 (noting there is some fear that sovereign
entities could also force private parties into undesirable transactions).
148.
See id. at 1605-06.
149.
See supra Section I.A.
150.
See Jason E. Stach & Jeffrey A. Freeman, District Court or the PTO: Choosing Where
to Litigate Patent Invalidity, FINNEGAN, https://www.finnegan.comlen/insights/district-court-orthe-pto-choosing-where-to-litigate-patent.html [https://perma.cc/6VTG-6UN5] (last visited Feb.
20, 2019).
151.
See id.
152.
See id.
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Another question that may arise in the wake of St. Regis is
whether tribal immunity should be considered a rentable commodity.
Some commenters believe that such arrangements are increasingly
becoming a public concern. 153 In response, courts and the federal
government have been cracking down on "rent-a-tribe" agreements. 154
To date, no doctrine allows immunity to attach to a tribe's property
when "rented out."1 55 However, tribes and other advocates for similar
business models might argue that the term "rented" is an unfair
connotation for what they would consider normal business transactions.
Proponents of this view argue that these agreements are not improper
rent-seeking, but are nestled with significant policy reasons that largely
benefit tribal communities. 15 6 Tribes already engage in regulatory
arbitrage, such as using their land for profit, and allowing tribes a space
in the technology world would open more space for tribal governments
to grow. 15 7
The next Subsections discuss two of the unaddressed points that
Mylan raised in the St. Regis case, but with respect to civil litigation.
The issues of sham transactions and waivers were both ignored by the
Federal Circuit but may arise in future patent proceedings.
1. Sham Transactions
Assuming that, intuitively, the transaction should not be allowed
in civil litigation, how would district courts legally deal with this issue?
One solution is to explore the "sham transaction" idea, which Mylan
presented in St. Regis158 and the Federal Circuit ignored. 15 9 Judge
William Bryson of the Eastern District of Texas, who oversaw the
parallel district court litigation of Allergan, Inc. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. raised the sham transaction issue in his
opinion. 16 0 Judge Bryson expressed concerns about the validity of such
153.

See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 6.

See Bailey, supra note 5; Robinson, supra note 6. "Rent-a-tribe" agreements take place
154.
when "enterprising businesses ... set up business models where a tribe shares in some part of the
revenue generated by the pay day lenders . . . [through] shell corporations that eventually trace
back to a tribal corporation or entity." Robinson, supra note 6.
Nor does there exist a doctrine that cloaks IP that does not initially belong to the tribe,
155.
to the Author's knowledge.
156.
See, e.g., Seth W. R. Brickey, Comment, Rent-A-Tribe: Using Tribal Immunity to
Shield Patentsfrom AdministrativeReview, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1493-94 (2018).
See id. The issue of whether tribal immunity should be "rentable" overall is beyond
157.
the scope of this Note, which will address such concerns only within the realm of intellectual
property.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 10-11.
158.
159.
See supra Section I.C.
160.
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at
*3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
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transactions 161 but eventually held for Allergan, ordering the joinder of
the Tribe to the suit.1 6 2

Sham transactions frequently occur in other business contexts
outside the realm of sovereign immunity, such as in tax law. 163 The
sham transaction doctrine is composed of case law that provides courts
with several factors to weigh when considering whether a transaction
is valid or a sham. 164 Courts that have applied the doctrine have
considered factors including the price of the transaction, the actual
control of the purchased property, and the benefit of the transaction to
the seller. 165 Outside of the tax landscape, other factors that can
determine whether an assignment is improper include whether the
"business reasons" were proper, when the assignment occurred, and
whether there was an admission that the motive was to create or
destroy jurisdiction. 166
Mylan asked the Federal Circuit to perform similar analysis on
the transfer of the Restasis patents in St. Regis. 16 7 Mylan argued that
Allergan and the Tribe met the factors for a sham assignment because
of the price of the transaction, 168 the curious timing of the transaction,
and the Tribe's ultimate lack of control over the Restasis patents.1 6 9
Therefore, under what courts consider a sham assignment, Mylan
appeared to have a good argument against destroying jurisdiction in
federal court. 170
Like with many balancing tests, however, courts may struggle
to apply the sham transaction doctrine in a consistent and predictable
fashion. This may be true for district courts, especially since the
Federal Circuit was silent on the argument in St. Regis. Consider
altered facts of the original Allergan transaction: The Tribe paid a
considerable sum for the patents or took on more control of the patents.

.

161.
Id. at *5 ("[The Court does not hold that the assignment of the patent rights to the
Tribe is valid . .
162.
Id.
163.
See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Recent Developments in the Law Affecting Conversation
Easements:Renewed Tax Benefits, Substantiation, Valuation, "StewardshipGifts," Subordination,
Trusts, and Sham Transactions, 11 WYO. L. REV. 433, 468-69 (2011).
164.
See David Klasing, What Is the Sham Transaction Doctrine?, TAX L. OFFICES DAVID
W. KLASING (July 28, 2014), https://klasing-associates.com/question/sham-transaction-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/77YV-NB3U].
165.
See id.
166.
See Attorneys Tr. v. Videotape Comput. Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.
1996).
167.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 10-11.
168.
Id. at 28. Namely, Allergan gave the Tribe money to take the patents and assert
sovereign immunity, despite the fact that patents are a major revenue stream. Id.
169.
See id. at 27-29.
170.
See id.
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Then, the analysis would differ because the Tribe would be able to
demonstrate that the transaction was not a sham from the factors of
the balancing test, especially if it could prove that the price and the
transfer of control of the patents were made in good faith."
Some commenters have argued that the Allergan agreement was
not a sham at all because the Tribe received royalties and ownership of
the Restasis patents, even though Allergan maintained the effective
rights of the patents. 172 Therefore, one could argue that because the
transaction economically benefited both parties, valuable consideration
was exchanged and thus the transaction was proper. 173 If parties
already seek tribal immunity to work around federal and state laws,
why not let them continue to do so and allow Congress to legislate the
174
issue, given that immunity is a congressionally-granted power?
This approach, however, seems to imply that the fact that a
benefit was conferred onto both parties automatically legitimizes a
transaction, perhaps opening the door to other similarly undesirable
Such an approach to the "sham" query would also
maneuvers.
undermine the patent system itself.1 75
With the sham transaction doctrine, there are endless workarounds for factors like the timing inquiry above. If a company decided
to begin its inventive process on tribal grounds, it may have a claim that
the tribe "controlled" the research and patents from the very beginning.
Ultimately, however, even if companies continuously find creative and
nontraditional solutions to their issues, the lack of a bright-line rule
will allow courts to do what they do best: draw lines themselves.
2. Waiver of Immunity in Civil Litigation
Although courts may be best equipped to determine if a specific
transaction is improper using a balancing test, a bright-line rule could
address such transactions more effectively. Courts can opt to impose a
waiver of sovereign immunity from various actions by a tribe. 176 In St.

See Klasing, supra note 161.
171.
172.
See Brickey, supra note 153, at 1491-92.
See id. at 1492.
173.
See id. at 1494.
174.
See Brief of Askeladden LLC as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to St. Regis Mohawk
175.
Tribe's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 2017 WL
6272028 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2017) (Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR2016-01129, IPR201601130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132).
See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
176.
("[There is a distinction between an express waiver of immunity, and waiver by actions.. . .").
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Regis, Mylan argued that the Tribe waived sovereign immunity when
it joined the infringement action on the patents.1 7 7
Mylan in St. Regis argued that under Vas-Cath, the Tribe's
actions of bringing suit represented a waiver of sovereign immunity due
to the "tactical advantage" that the Tribe and Allergan sought to gain. 178
While Vas-Cath concerns state sovereignty and a USPTO interference
proceeding rather than district court litigation, its reasoning could still
be useful in situations involving "Allergan-like" transactions in civil
litigation. 179 Provoking and litigating an interference contest clearly
and unequivocally waives any immunity, as the court held in VasCath.180 These principles similarly apply to a transaction that was
completed in order to circumvent litigation.
If courts find that a patent transaction alone waives immunity,
they would be hard-pressed to find precedent to support a ruling. 181 A
court may have to take into consideration the suspicious timing of the,
transaction to bolster its analysis.
C. "Genuine"Patent Transactions by Tribes in USPTO Proceedings
The issue of "genuine" patent transactions raises a significant
question. Supposing that IPRs and PGRs are like civil litigation, 182 and
tribes are unable to assert sovereign immunity in either proceeding, 183
where does the St. Regis decision leave tribes who "genuinely" procured
their intellectually property? One could argue that the decision
unfairly limits a group that has been historically protected in other
contexts.18 4 If IPRs and PGRs allow private parties to bring petitions
against tribes that are immune from civil suit, this would give any party
an avenue to attack typically immune tribes. While this makes sense
in the St. Regis case where Allergan tried to manufacture an exception,
this decision will likely harm genuine patent holders asserting
immunity.
But there remains the question of who should be considered a
"genuine" patent holder. For example, what if the Allergan transaction

177.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2018); supra Section I.C.
178.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 23, 31; Vas-Cath Inc., 473 F.3d at 1384.
179.
See Vas-Cath Inc., 473 F.3d at 1384.
180.
Id. at 1385.
181.
See Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1378; supra Section I.B.
182.
See Rink, supra note 25.
183.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329-30, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
184.
See Stephen D. Osborne, ProtectingTribal Stories: The Perilsof Propertization,28 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 203, 208-09 (2003).
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happened prior to 2012, before IPRs were an available avenue for
patent review? Or alternatively, what if the Tribe purchased a patent
portfolio for consideration, receiving exclusive rights to the property?
Would the PTAB be more sympathetic to the Tribe, or has St. Regis
created an "open season" on patent-holding tribes that are typically
immune from litigation, given the similarities of IPRs to civil
litigation?1 8 5
The St. Regis court would strictly reject immunity in even these
cases of "genuine" patent holders, but this Note argues that this will
result in unfair treatment of tribes. Tribes, which already have limited
resources,1 86 will surely be further burdened by not only their
vulnerability in IPRs, but the chilling effects that come with the St.
Regis decision. For example, will tribes refrain from attempting to
obtain patents on their innovations due to their vulnerability in IPR?
Arguments that tribes have been a historically suppressed group
may naturally follow. It has been argued that IP laws have a slightly
18 7 IP
altered purpose or policy when applied in the context of tribes.
law's focus on protecting profits for the creator sometimes conflicts with
the community focus of tribal groups."' Regarding patents specifically,
tribes that possess esoteric experience, such as agricultural knowledge,
run into unique obstacles in patent law that they may be unequipped to
89
bypass with their limited resources.1
It then follows that because tribes are unable to assert immunity
in IPRs in the wake of the St. Regis decision, even tribes that
"genuinely" acquired patents may be out of luck. Moreover, one could
argue that IPRs are in rem proceedings,190 so even if tribes genuinely
acquired patents, the tribes may still be subject to an IPR challenge
191 Many commenters
given the questions left open in Upper Skagit.
argue that the determination of whether sovereign immunity extends
to IPRs should have been left to Congress.1 92 Since determination of
sovereign immunity abrogation has historically been left to Congress, it
93
should have determined the issue, instead of the PTAB or the courts.1

See supra Sections IA, I.B.
185.
See Governo, supra note 44, at 204.
186.
See Osborne, supra note 181, at 209.
187.
See id. at 223.
188.
See id. at 225.
189.
See Brief of the Ass'n for Accessible Meds. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
190.
supra note 109, at 9-10.
See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1652 (2018).
191.
See supra Section I.C.
192.
See Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians, Nat'l Indian Gaming
193.
Ass'n, & United South & Eastern Tribes in Support of Patent Holder the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe's
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 114, at 10-12; Brickey, supra note 153, at 1494.
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However, in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy
Group, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, said that IPRs fall
squarely within the public-rights doctrine, and that patents are the
grant of a public franchise. 194 IPRs are a reconsideration of that grant
by the USPTO that does not violate Article III.195 Justice Thomas'
language in Oil States seemingly allows the PTAB to rule on the issue,
even if issues like sovereign immunity are a factor to be considered. 196
D. Other Patent Transactionsin Civil Litigation
If a district court decides that a patent transaction involving a
tribe is not a sham transaction, would it simply dismiss the case if the
tribe was a necessary party? Probably, but the line between a real
transaction and a sham is one that will likely always be blurry. Such
issues are the points that the St. Regis court did not reach, so potential
parties will have to find a legal hook in order to argue that tribal
sovereign immunity does not exist when they believe a sham
transaction has been made. 197
III. SOLUTION

There were numerous questions presented in St. Regis that left
unresolved issues at the intersection between tribal sovereign
immunity and patent law. Ultimately, who should determine these
issues? Is there a blanket solution to whether or not tribal sovereign
immunity is "rentable" in patent law, or should the issue be decided on
a case-by-case basis? If there is a blanket solution, is it possible to
preserve the historical rights of tribal governments while maintaining
the integrity of patent law?
This Part describes two possible solutions that may answer the
questions remaining following St. Regis. First, this Part explores the
possibility of congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity in
similar cases. This presents the "cleanest" solution, but it is unlikely
given Congress' historical passivity in tribal immunity cases. 198 A

194.
Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
Id.
195.
196.
See id. It is worth noting that other supporters of the tribe highlight that state
universities have invoked their sovereign immunity with IPRs even before the St. Regis Mohawks
tried to do so. See Mitchell Feller, IP and Sovereign Immunity: Why You Can't Always Sue for IP
Infringement, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/01/ipinfringement-sovereign-immunityid=93050/ [https://perma.cc/5566-P4WD].
197.
See supra Section I.C.
198.
See Hunter Malasky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Need for Congressional
Action, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2469, 2478, 2480, 2490 (2018).
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second, more plausible avenue of dealing with this issue is for courts to
employ a multifactor balancing test to reconcile the issues the Allergan
maneuver presented. This approach will draw from different important
policies from courts in determining whether tribal sovereign immunity
should be allowed as a defense to suit. The following Sections explore
both solutions in detail, examining their feasibility, benefits, and
drawbacks.
A. CongressionalAction
Perhaps the cleanest solution to the issues presented in this
Note is for Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity in certain patent
proceedings. Any congressional action would be unequivocal, creating
a bright-line rule for courts or the PTAB to address issues that St. Regis
left open. 199
In 2017, Senator Claire McCaskill introduced a bill to Congress
in response to the Allergan maneuver. 20 0 The bill was narrow, stating
that sovereign immunity should be abrogated as a defense in IPRs. 201
Of course, the Federal Circuit ruled on that exact issue; however, should
other bills be introduced, the question becomes whether Congress will
(1) abrogate broadly, (2) abrogate narrowly, or (3) decline to abrogate at
all.
There is a risk that congressional abrogation could be too broad,
declining to recognize immunity in a large number of patent-related
contexts.
However, because Congress has historically abrogated
narrowly, 2 02 it is unlikely that any congressional action would comprise
a blanket rule that precluded tribes from asserting immunity in patent
law. A broader rule would also conflict with Congress' interest in
promoting and protecting the resources of tribal governments.
Therefore, any congressional action would likely include limitations
narrowing the scope of the bill.
One action Congress should consider is to draft a textually
narrow bill, like the one Senator McCaskill proposed. 20 3 As the analysis
above illustrates, the situations in which sovereign immunity may play
a role are not limited to IPRs. 2 0 4 Congressional abrogation should
See supra Section I.B.
199.
200.
See S. 1948, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017); Michael Erman, Senator McCaskill Drafts Bill in
(Oct.
5,
2017,
1:16 PM),
Response
to Allergan Patent Maneuver, REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-congress/senator-mccaskill-drafts-bill-inresponse-to-allergan-patent-maneuver-idUSKBNICA2DO [https://perma.cclWBS4-3TQ7].
201.
See S. 1948.
202.
See supra Section I.B.
203.
See S. 1948.
204.
See supra Part II.
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define the extent to which their legislation should apply to patent cases.
If Congress intends immunity to apply, but with further limitations
(such as subjecting the immune party to further fees mandated by
Congress), then such limitations should be explicit in the legislation as
well. 2 0 5 This is as far as Congress should go regarding the specificity of
any legislation. Any further narrowing of the issue may lead to
confusion for tribes and patent owners alike. Thus, if applied to the
hypotheticals presented in Part II above, congressional action should
look narrow in most potential situations.
Regarding involvement of sovereign tribes in PGRs and IPRs,
any congressional action should explicitly waive immunity in all
proceedings, as the bill introduced in 2017 would. 206 Following the
reasoning from the St. Regis, PGRs and IPRs are administrative
proceedings brought and executed by the PTAB. 207 Any potential
waiver of sovereign immunity in the PGR and IPR space must be
unequivocal, given their nature and the St. Regis holding. 208 Senator
McCaskill introduced the bill to the Senate on October 5, 2017, but it
has not been acted on since. 209 It follows that Congress may not believe
legislating around this issue is a high priority.
Congressional abrogation of immunity in patent litigation would
be a more pressing, but more difficult, matter to pass. By exploring a
waiver of sovereign immunity in patent litigation, Congress would be
opening up an area of abrogation that it has not examined before.
Furthermore, any waiver of immunity in civil litigation would seem to
contradict Congress' symbiotic relationship with tribal governments. 2 10
One could imagine a bill that limits but does not waive immunity
completely as a potential course of congressional action.
Such
legislation would be narrow as well but would set forth parameters in
which immunity is waived. However, this solution may violate the
requirement that abrogation be unequivocal. 211 If there is some
limitation of immunity (e.g., "Allergan-like" transactions after litigation
has begun will waive immunity, but transactions occurring before
litigation does not waive immunity), the bill risks being too opaque for
parties to comply with.

205.
See Malasky, supra note 195, at 2485.
206.
See S. 1948.
207.
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2018); supra Section I.C.
208.
See supra Sections I.B, IC, II.A.
209.
See S. 1948.
210.
See supra Section I.B.
211.
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
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Congressional action regarding sovereign immunity in patent
proceedings is ideal because it would give tribes and other parties a
bright-line rule to work with.
However, such action is unlikely,
especially in patent litigation matters. 212 If Congress chooses not to act,
courts will be left to determine where tribal sovereign immunity
applies.
B. A Test for Courts to Determine if PartiesHave Waived Immunity
The St. Regis court avoided exploring other reasons why
immunity should or should not apply in patent proceedings. Perhaps
the court should not have ruled for Mylan based on the nature of IPRs
213
In
themselves, but based on the circumstances of the transaction.
any case, courts have plenty to consider if this situation were to come
2 14
This
up in the future-especially if it were to arise in civil litigation.
(some
solution proposes a test that considers multiple factors
dispositive, others not) in determining whether immunity should apply
in such situations. 2 15
1.

Dispositive Factors

There are two main factors that should be considered dispositive
when courts determine whether a tribe has waived immunity. First, if
a tribe can prove ownership/assignment of the patents before the
transaction (via the date of the patent's grant), it should be entitled to
immunity regardless of other circumstances. Second, and conversely,
immunity should be waived if a tribe's opponent can prove that the
immunity is being asserted in bad faith.
Tribes, like any other individuals, can use patent laws to protect
their individual property. 216 If a tribe has used its resources to create,
modify, and innovate an original idea into patentable subject matter, it
should be entitled to the same rights it typically enjoys with the courts.
In order to preserve the long-standing policies of tribal immunity, tribes
who obtained and kept patents for their innovations should not be
subject to a waiver of immunity. 2 17 Therefore, if a tribe has owned the

See Malasky, supra note 195, at 2478, 2480, 2490; supra Section I.D.
212.
See supra Sections IC, II.B.
213.
214.
See supra Section II.B.1.
The solution presented in this Note does not argue that the St. Regis decision was
215.
incorrect, but rather that its reasoning could have been modified to apply more broadly to both
IPRs and patent litigation in general.
See Osborne, supra note 181, at 223.
216.
See id. at 222-23.
217.
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patent according to its grant date, it should be allowed to participate in
legal transactions protected by its sovereign immunity.
In St. Regis, whether Allergan's transaction with the Tribe was
made in bad faith or not remains an open question. 218 However, if
Mylan had been able to prove bad faith, such evidence should be
dispositive in favor of waiving a tribe's immunity from a patent
proceeding. Given the general reluctance to find that a tribe has waived
immunity, especially in civil litigation, the bad faith threshold should
be set high. 2 19 It follows that bad faith should be defined narrowly.
That is, absent a showing of fraud or dishonesty, immunity should not
be waived.
Mylan would likely argue that Allergan's "sham
transaction" should qualify as a bad faith transaction. 220 However,
unlike a bad faith transaction-where evidence of fraud would be
dispositive-the factors that determine a sham transaction should be
balanced (as described below), especially since those factors are being
considered within the realm of a waiver of sovereign immunity. 22 1
2. Balancing Factors
If no dispositive factors exist, courts should apply a balancing
test to determine if sovereign immunity has been waived in a patent
proceeding where a transaction has taken place. While different issues
may weigh more heavily than others in certain cases, none should be
independently determinative outside of the two discussed above. A
court should consider the following three main, nondispositive factors:
(1) the benefits the transaction conferred to the parties involved, (2) the
degree of the parties' control and assignment of the patents involved,
and (3) when the transaction took place. These factors stem from both
the sham transaction doctrine and the issues that St. Regis
presented. 222
The benefit conferred to the parties and the control of the
patents are broad factors that hinge on the specific facts of the
transaction. 223 Courts should consider how the sham transaction
doctrine treats both issues while considering the integrity of the patent
ownership. Regarding the transaction in question, the benefit conferred
will always depend on the agreement between the parties. Even if
218.
See supra Section I.C.
219.
See Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, STAN. L. SCH.
BLOGS (Sept. 13, 2017), https://1aw.stanford.edu/201 7/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-andpatent-law/ [https://perma.cclPQ9S-CFZL].
220.
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 27-29.
221.
See supra Section II.B.1.
222.
See id.
223.
See Klasing, supra note 161; supra Section II.B.1.
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agreements are not always transparent, courts should take into account
whether the parties, especially the sovereign- entity, are receiving
adequate consideration. Supporters of the appellees in St. Regis would
argue that the Tribe did not receive any benefit from the Allergan
transaction because they did not actually gain control of the patents. 22 4
While the Tribe did receive money for their immunity, courts should
attempt to balance the actual consideration exchanged with the
potential hampering of the patent landscape in similar transactions. 2 25
The remaining balancing factor-the timing of the transactionis easier for courts to determine but should not be dispositive either.
Moves like Allergan's transaction one week before a PTAB hearing
appear to be for the purpose of taking advantage of tribal sovereign
immunity. 226 However, while heavily suspicious and probative of bad
faith, situations may exist where such timing was the result of
coincidence. Furthermore, if timing was a dispositive factor, courts
would struggle with where to draw the line. Allergan made its
maneuver one week before a scheduled PTAB hearing, but what if the
transaction occurred two weeks, or a month before? Thus, the timing
of the transaction should be heavily weighed but should not be
dispositive for these reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's ruling in St. Regis rested on proper
grounds; however, the opinion did not address a broader question,
which may even extend beyond patent law: Can tribal immunity be
rented through a patent transaction? If so, in what circumstances is
immunity waived? It is possible that the Federal Circuit purposely left
the broader issue open for Congress to act on. However, by not
commenting on the matter at all, the St. Regis court left the door open
for other patent infringers or owners to try their luck hiding under the
shelter of tribal immunity outside of IPRs.
Regardless of its scope, the St. Regis decision has a large impact
on tribes, given the growing popularity of IPRs. Perhaps the court
should have considered the scarcity of tribal resources and the effects
this decision will have on both tribal entities and patent law. The
balancing test in this Note strikes this balance because it encourages
courts to take such considerations into account when examining the

224.
225.
226.

See supra Sections IC, II.B.1.
See Brickey, supra note 153, at 1452, 1494.
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factors of the test but will still have the latitude to weigh the integrity
of both the patent system and tribal sovereign immunity.
As it stands, courts will have to balance tribal interests with the
policies of patent law in future cases without such guidance. If future
cases are outside the scope of IPRs, or even outside of IP as a whole, the
St. Regis decision cannot be solely relied upon to determine if sovereign
immunity should apply.
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